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5 G8 Summits and Compliance 
ELLA KOKOTSIS AND JOSEPH P. DANIELS 
People and politicians are dominated by quite excessive expecta-
tions as to what can possibly, or practically, be delivered by gov-
ernmental economic policies. 
- T.W. Hutchison, Knowledge and Ignorance in Economics 
Introduction 
Since 1975, the leaders of the major industrial democracies have met at the 
annual Group ofSeven and Group ofEight (G7/G8) summits to address the 
most pressing international issues of the day, deliberate on shared problems 
and collectively set directions for the global community. The summits have 
often produced ambitious and wide-ranging agreements in an effort to gen-
erate a multilateral consensus on a diverse number of shared economic and 
politicar issues. 
Des pite the attention given the G7 /G8 summit process and the new 
interest by international relations theorists in the issue of compliance with 
international agreements (Jacobson and Weiss, 1995; Chayes and Chayes, 
1994) there has been little effort to analyze and explain compliance with, 
and explore the credibility of, summit policy commitments, and to do so as 
a foundation for identifying proposals to improve the summit process. 
Although there exists a wealth of scholarly and professional writing on the 
G8, virtually all of it focuses on the first order question of reaching agree-
ments through effective policy coordination. Thus, little has been produced 
on the soundness of these commitments and the extent to which summit 
members comply with them. 
Do the G8 summits make a difference? Is the summit process cred-
ible and worthy of the enormous media attention it receives? Studies of 
summit compliance and credibility indicate that the summits do accomplish 
something, but perhaps not as much as one would like them to. Further, 
there are significant differences in the compliance record across countries 
and issue areas. Reforms suggested here, which would curtail the pomp and 
circumstance, streamline the summit format, and narrow the issues dis-
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cussed to those that meet core criteria for effectiveness, should generate 
fewer, yet higher quality commitments, which are more likely to be fulfilled. 
This chapter details the findings of separate data sets on G7 summit 
compliance based on studies by George von Furstenberg and Joseph 
Daniels, Ella Kokotsis, and Ella Kokotsis and John J. Kirton, as well as 
findings on the soundness of these commitments by Joseph Daniels. It then 
examines explanations of summit compliance and presents conclusions 
about why compliance is higher in certain issue areas than in others. It final-
ly offers practica} proposals and policy options for the G8 partners to reform 
the summit process in order to generate higher quality policy commitments 
that are more likely to be fulfilled. 
Gauging Compliance with and the Credibility of Policy Commitments 
For past summits to be considered productive and meaningful, and the 
process viewed as credible, the policy commitments endorsed by the leaders 
and made public though the summit declaration should m~et three criteria. 
First, they should be ambitious. Second, they should be complied with. 
Thirdly, the links between means and ends should be based on sound rea-
soning. Existing evidence is used to examine ifthe policy promises made at 
the summits meet these criteria. Doing so casts light on the various conjec-
tures and theories of effective multilateral policymaking. In this manner, the 
quantitative record of the summits is employed to identify past success and 
provide insights on how to improve the summit process itself. 
Before summarizing various findings about the record of compli-
ance, it is useful to consider the general methodological approach that makes 
summary scores meaningful. Von Furstenberg and Daniels (1991, 1992) 
were the first to quantify commitments made at the su mm its and gauge the 
extent to which these commitments have been fulfilled. This work, which 
centers on the economic communique only, establishes a uniform approach 
for gauging compliance. 
Methodological Approach to Compliance Measurement 
Arguably, the economic communiqué issued at the conclusion of each sum-
mit represents a quasi-legal contract, as the leaders endorse the commit-
ments contained therein. This document is used as the sole data source for 
the von Furstenberg and Daniels methodology, which ignores statements or 
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press releases that may proceed or follow the release of the communiqué. 
Peter Hajnal's study, The Seven Power Summit: Documents .from the 
Summits of Industrialized Countries, 197 5-1989, contains the official eco-
nomic communique of these early summits and is the source document of 
these studies (Hajnal, 1989). 
There are two general types of commitments that are embedded in 
the communiqué. The first type is a policy measure, which is a commitment 
to deliver a specific legislative package, such as a balanced budget agree-
ment. The second type of commitment is a policy outcome, which is a shift 
in an ecopomic variable, such as reducing the deficit, or reducing inflation. 
Only those commitments that are concrete enough to identify and quantify 
the intended policy measure or policy outcome are considered. 
The next step in monitoring compliance is to establish a scoring 
metric that assigns a number reflecting the degree to which a commitment 
was fu lfilled. The classic approach is to define a range of scores from -1 to 
1, where a score of 1 reflects complete fulfillment. A score of -1 is assigned 
if the actual outcome was the opposite of that committed to. Focusing pri-
marily on policy outcomes, von Furstenberg and Daniels use the entire ínter-
val between -1 and 1 to as.sign scores. This methodology enables the iden-
tification and quantification of the commitments and assesses in a uniform 
manner the degree to which they were fulfilled. The scores can then be used 
to examine various hypothesis regarding the summit process. 
Summary of Findings on Compliance 
Using the methodology described above, von Furstenberg and Daniels 
(1992) derive an overall average score for the 209 commitments revealed in 
the communiqués ofthe first fifteen summits. The average score was 0.317, 
or 32 percent, meaning that, roughly one-third of what was promised was 
actually delivered by the policymakers. These results suggest that G7 mem-
bers do comply, albeit weakly, with their summit commitments. Moreover, 
compliance scores vary widely by country, with high compliance coming 
from Canada and Britain and low compliance from the United States and 
France. Compliance also varíes widely by issue area, with intemational 
trade and energy receiving high compliance scores and interest and 
exchange rate management receiving low scores. 
Subsequent research by von Furstenberg and Daniels (1993) com-
bines macroeconomic forecasts generated by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) with the policy commitments made 
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at the annual summits. Since these forecasts are generated so near the time 
of the summits, it is reasonable to assume that the forecasts and summit 
commitments are independent of each other. The forecasts, therefore, can 
be used to determine the degree of ambition of summit commitments. 
Using the 209 commitments of the first study, the authors are able 
to generate sample statistics to test the joint-null hypothesis of "no summit 
ambition" and "no summit effect". Again, though the overall seo re is low, 
the authors are able to reject, in a statistical sense, the null hypothesis. That 
is, the commitments are ambitious and there was low, but positive compli-
ance (see Table 5.1 ). This conclusion stands in stark contrast to the opinion 
of one sherpa at the 1997 Denver summit, who claimed that the "summits 
Table 5.1 Average (a), Standard Deviation (SD) and Number of 
Scores (N) for 1975-89 Economic Summit Undertakings 
Seo re Average SD N (N-1)"'"' 
All Undertakings 0.307 0.684 203 0.070 
- with 6A replacing 6. 0.355 0.649 135 0.086 
------- - ------- - ---- -- -- - ---~:-~Y. ~!.>-~1_1~9:•. Q!..~~-~~~_!-~ ~-~~!"&~~!~-~Y.-~!~~-~-~ _1_?~-~ -~~!'. --------------------------- -
United States 0.246 0 .730 33 0.177 
Japan 0.262 0.632 28 0.192 
Gennany 0.346 0.740 23 0.213 
France 0.240 0.612 23 0.213 
United Kingdom 0.413 0.743 21 0.224 
Italy 0.274 0.688 26 0.200 
Canada 0.409 0.603 24 0.209 
All Single-Country 0.306 0.685 178 0.075 
All Multi-Country 0.314 0.687 25 0.204 
__________________ _____________________ ~·--º~!~!! _~Y. X~! !!.~!~l!!i.!l.':'~ -<;_l!l_l_t_~l!!~l!~.i!!!Y. ___ _______ ____ _____ ______________ __ ___ _ 
l. Real GNP Growth 0.397 0.623 17 0.250 
2. Demand Composition 0.233 0.801 7 0.408 
3. Intemational Trade 0.734 0.364 7 0.408 
4. Fiscal Adjustments 0.259 0.680 40 0.160 
5. Interest Rate 0.221 0.526 20 0.229 
6. InflationRate 0.221 0.731 80 0.113 
6A. Multi-Country Scoring 0.266 0.672 12 0.302 
7. Foreign Exchange Rate -0.700 0.301 2 1 
8. Aid and Schedules 0.265 0.388 5 0.5 
9. Energy 0.660 0.559 25 0.204 
Direct Policy Measures 
All Others 
All Except Energy 
All Except lnflation 
0.279 
0.309 
0.258 
0.364 
0.617 
0.688 
0.686 
0.646 
10 
193 
178 
123 
0.333 
0.072 
0.075 
0.091 
TI1is is the standard deviation (SD) of the average score under the joint null hypothesis that the population value of the 
SD of scores is 1 because Summit ambition and effect are both O. 
Source: Scores for 1975-80 Summits calculated by George von Furstenberg and Joseph P. Daniels 
in "Policy Undertakings by the Seven Summit Countries: Ascertaining the Degree ofCompliance". 
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 35 (Autumn 1991), 267-308 
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tend to under-promise and over-deliver". 
Subsequent compliance studies, conducted by Kokotsis (1998), and 
Kokotsis and Kirton (1997), analyze the G7's compliance record from 1988-
1995 in regard to the G7's environment and development commitments, 
which flourished during this period. These studies explore the compliance 
record of the G8's most and least powerful members, the United Sta tes and 
Canada, in an effort to examine the effects on compliance of overall relative 
capability and to explore the way differences in national institutions affect 
compliancct outcomes. 
Four issue areas critica! to the global environment and development 
agenda - climate change, biodiversity, developing country debt and assis-
tance to Russia - are considered. The period from 1988-1995 provides an 
era of sustained summit attention to, and important action on these issues. It 
is a period during which summit attention and ambition has varied, and one 
where lags in compliance are visible. This combination of eight years, two 
countries, and four issue areas, including 83 specific commitments, offers 
enough cases to identify compliance patterns and isolate key compliance 
variables (see Figure 5.1). 
Figure 5.1 A Comparison of U.S. vs. Canadian Compliance with G7 
Commitments, 1988-95 
W Tot. i# of Commttments 
20 .. 17 • Cdn. Net Leve! of Compliance 
• US Net Leve! of Compliance 
-10 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
SummitYear 
Source: Compiled by E. Kokotsis 
These findings suggest that during its third summit cycle, the G7 
produced a large number of specific and often ambitious environment and 
development commitments - 34 regarding climate change, 15 regarding 
biodiversity, 13 regarding developing country debt, and 21 regarding 
assistañce to Russia. Canadian and U.S. compliance with these commitments 
has generally been positive, with an overall score of 43%. Yet wide varia-
tions appear by country, issue area, and over time: Canada's net score of 
--
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53o/o contrasts with the U.S. net score of 34o/o. Compliance is much higher 
in regard to assistance to Russia and developing country debt, than for cli-
mate change and above all biodiversity. 
These findings suggest severa} trends. First, during its third seven-
year cycle, the G7 offered a larger number of specific and often ambitious 
environment and development commitments than was the overall norm for 
the earlier period. These findings thus suggest that the summit has become 
more active in generating specific, identifiable, and measurable agreements 
in these key areas. 
Second, wide variations arise by country, from Canada's 53o/o to the 
U.S.'s 34%. This outcome is consistent with that found by von Furstenberg 
and Daniels ( 41 o/o for Canada and 25% for the U.S.). As the methodology 
of Kokotsis, and Kokotsis and Kirton differs slightly from that of von 
Furstenberg and Daniels, as the former employ a discrete scale, using only 
the values of -1, O and 1, while the latter use all possible values between -1 
and 1, direct or absolute comparisons cannot be made. Hence, no definitive 
conclusions can be reached regarding rising or falling compliance scores 
between the periods considered, or for a widening or narrowing of compli-
ance gaps between nations. 
Third, there continues to be wide variation across issue areas . 
During the third summit cycle, compliance is much higher in regard to assis-
tance for Russia (81 %) and developing country debt (73%), than for climate 
change (34%) and, particularly, biodiversity (-13%). 
Finally, there is significant variation over time within the third cycle 
of summitry for G7 environment commitments. Compliance is lower for 
both Canada and the U.S. in the pre-Rio period of 1988-1991 than in the 
post-Rio period of 1992-1995. There is a notable peak period of high com-
pliance, which both Canada and the US share, centred around the Rio year 
of 1992. 
Means-Ends Relationships and Credibility of Commitments 
Just as the declarations make public the policy promises, they also provide 
glimpses of what the actions promised are aimed at helping accomplish. In 
this way, sorne of the general economic relationships and specific links 
between means and ends the policymakers subscribe to have come to light, 
revealing occasional disagreements, shifts of emphasis or evolution ofview-
points over time. 
In theory, disagreement among policymakers on the "correct" struc-
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ture of the economy, and therefore the appropriate policy responses, can 
presenta formidable obstacle to economic policy coordination. It is doubt-
ful that such disagreements are very inhibiting to the policy process, as pol-
icymakers are exposed to various models of domestic agencies as well as the 
models of their foreign counterparts. Thus, a consensus view is developed 
that incorporates the various modeling ideologies, forecasts, track records, 
and judgments, all of which are held with varying degrees of conviction. 
Multiplier and policy lag uncertainty, on the other hand, may indeed inhibit 
the coordination process. In essence, the viability of economic theory that 
policymakers subscribe to becomes a "technological constraint" on estab-
lishing policymaking credibility (Blackburn and Christensen, 1989). 
Daniels (1993) represents the lone comprehensive empirical evalu-
ation ofthe means-ends relationships advanced at the economic summits. In 
this study, the various relationships that were revealed in the declarations of 
the first fifteen summits were inventoried and evaluated in light of recent 
empirical evidence found in the literature or provided by the author. Based 
on this evidence, the relationships were judged as either "wel1-advised", 
"arguable", or "ill-advised". Further, the relationships were classified as 
Keynesian , new classical , or other, to determine ifthere was any progression 
of economic thinking revealed in the declaration. 
Eighteen distinct economic relationships were gleaned from the 
declarations of the first fifteen summits. The classification of relationships 
displayed no significant pattem or shift in economic thinking over time. lt 
does, however, show that understandings that relate to national aggregates 
imply a traditional Keynesian view, while understandings that rest on exter-
nallinkages are consistent with a Mundell-Fiemming model for interna! and 
externa! balances. 
One might suspect that policymakers would play it safe and pro-
mote publicly only those actions whose motivation is above chal1enge, thus 
reinforcing the credibility oftheir policy announcements. By comparing the 
relationships advanced in the declaration with the empirical evidence, this 
does not appear to be the case. Seven of the eighteen relationships were 
considered to be "well advised". Ten, however, were considered to be 
"arguable". Hence, the effectiveness of many of the policy actions 
announced at the summits may be compromised by the uncertainty of eco-
nomic theory and models' forecasts that policymakers subscribe to. 
To summarize, the G7/8 summits have delivered a large number of 
policy commitments on economic, environmental, and development issues. 
The extent to which these commitments were fulfilled is positive, though, in 
! 
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the case of economic commitments, disappointingly low. Further, promises 
were ambitious, rejecting the notion that policy makers "do not go out on a 
limb" at the summits. Additionally, the means-ends relationships that poli-
cy commitments rest upon are suspect and possibly compromise the effec-
tiveness of the policy actions even if they were fully complied with. Thus, 
the summits are indeed worth something, but leave much room for improve-
ment in the process they currently follow. 
Explanations of Summit Compliance 
Given that summit declarations are not legally binding documents, that no 
formal enforcement mechanism exists to ensure that implementation sys-
tematically occurs, that domestic circumstances and leadership change from 
year to year, and that sorne commitments are superseded by subsequent 
agreements, one might expect the compliance with G8 summit commit-
ments would be very low. The studies outlined above conclude, however, 
that over time, the summit has, in general, been active in generating agree-
ments that are specific, identifiable and measurable, that compliance with 
Summit commitments has been positive and sustained, and that positive 
compliance appears across countries. How does one account for and explain 
these pattems of summit compliance? 
Conjectures on Policy Coordination 
The scores that resulted from the von Furstenberg and Daniels studies 
described above were grouped by summit, country, function , and controlla-
bility (see Table 5.1). The authors use these aggregate scores to draw con-
clusions on sorne popular conjectures regarding international policy making. 
The first conjecture is that joint economic commitments tend to be honored 
to a lesser degree than an individual commitment, as collective commit-
ments generate "free-rider" problems. The findings indicate no statistical 
difference between these two types of commitments. Hence, compliance 
with collective commitments was no less than with commitments assigned 
to specific countries. 
The second conjecture considered is that commitments that promise 
delivery of a policy measure or instrument that is under the direct control of 
policy makers would be honored to a higher degree than commitments 
promising an outcome for a policy target (Putnam and Henning, 1989). The 
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scores reveal the opposite. Commitments on direct policy measures receive 
a lower than average score than those on economic targets. It appears that 
policymakers have as much difficulty adopting policy measures as they do 
forecasting the impact of policy measures on target variables.' 
Finally, it is argued that policy makers of smaller nations would 
scrupulously honour their commitments so as to provide political leverage 
over the policy makers ofthe larger and more powerful nations. Further, the 
degree to which one nation can visit macroeconomic extemalities upon 
another depends on the relative size of the nations (Dobson, 1991). As a 
result, large nations would be less likely to honor their commitments. 
Though Britain and Canada received the highest compliance scores, 
and the United States the second lowest, the scores do not reveal any sys-
tematic pattern based on economy size. Likewise, there is no significant 
correlation of compliance scores with the relative size of the economy, as 
measured by its GDP. Therefore, the evidence does not support either con-
jecture relating compliance to the size of the nation. 
Institutional Variables and Regimes 
Institutional variables and the role of regimes point to further explanations 
of summit compliance. The findings on debt and assistance to Russia indi-
cate that there has been a sustained, and in fact high level of summit com-
pliance by both Canada and the US in these issue areas during the third sum-
mit cycle. This reflects important national institutional variables at work. 
Within both of these issue areas, the implementation of summit resolutions 
occurs through long-established departments (Treasury and Finance) pos-
sessing well-defined domestic implementation responsibilities, and mani-
festing strong institutional links to powerful multilateral organizations. 
The existence of a well-defined and clearly established process 
within Treasury and Finance for the domestic implementation of debt and 
Russian-related commitments helps guarantee a systematic operationaliza-
tion ofthe communiqué. Given that finance ministries have the most regu-
larized communication through the G7 finance deputies process, compliance 
is generally higher with issues stemming from finance ministries, followed 
by those arising from foreign ministries. This view is confirmed by senior 
government officials in both Ottawa and Washington who affirm that 
"finance ministries have the most well-developed coordination of follow-
through, with the foreign ministries next". 2 A senior Canadian government 
official concurred with this correlation between the role of finance min-
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istries with respect to summit compliance: 
On the economic side, it's easier because the institutional frame-
work already exists. On the political side, there's no mechanism 
for follow-up. Thus the G7 has been less successful in ensuring 
follow-up on non-economic issues in the past. The G7 fmance 
deputies process ensures sorne level of follow-up, more so than 
within foreign ministries.3 
By contrast, the Department of Environment in Canada and the 
Environmental Protection Agency in the United States are examples of 
departments/agencies possessing less of an established process to deal with 
the implementation of summit commitments. This is primarily because 
these agencies/departments have been in existence for a relatively shorter 
period of time.They are bureaucratically less capable of dealing with the 
domestic implementation of international commitments. Moreover, they 
possess less money in overall budgetary terms and are thus less influential 
than older, more established great departments of state or central agencies -
such as Finance or Treasury. As such, lower compliance comes with envi-
ronment commitments than with those arising from departments of Finan ce 
and Treasury. 
National institutional variables further serve to account for Canada's 
higher overall record of summit compliance compared to that of the U.S. 
Within Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
(DFAIT), a permanent G8 summit coordination office, staffed with perma-
nent officers, exists to manage, handle, oversee and execute summit under-
takings beginning early on in the preparatory process and continuing 
throughout the year. By contrast, a summit coordination office, or "line 
office" dealing specifically with G8 undertakings, does not exist at the U.S. 
State Department, Treasury, or the White House. Although directives are 
sent out to ministries regarding summit undertakings, the thrust to move 
these initiatives forward often wanes after the annual summit dueto the fact 
that a central coordinating office does not exist in the US to execute surnmit 
resolutions. According to a US government official, "There is no summit 
coordination office, unlike in Canada, and the energy falls off dramatically 
post-summit" .4 
International institutional factors also affect summit compliance. 
Departments of Finance and Treasury possess well-established institutional 
links to long-existing international fora, including the París Club, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. These are the institu-
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tions responsible for the implementation of Russian assistance and debt-
related issues. Because the G7 members are the major shareholders within 
these institutions, they are able to set the agenda, prompt action and secure 
agreements on the implementation of these issues. By contrast, domestic 
environmental departments lack coordinating centres for G7 /8-related activ-
ity and oversight and rely for intemational implementation on the fragment-
ed specialized agencies ofthe United Nations. Here the G7 countries do not 
possess overwhelming controlling strength due to both institutional charac-
teristics (the one-country-one-vote rule) and underlying issue-specific capa-
bilities and contributions. An overall lower level of compliance is thus 
assured, especially for commitments which require action by international 
organizations for their implementation. 
Furthermore, the G7 Finance Ministers and Finance Deputies fora, 
which have existed since 1986, allows the G7 to reinforce the national-inter-
national institutional link and intensely monitor the implementation of 
G7/G8 commitments. The G7 Finance Ministers and Finance Deputies 
process is more institutionally entrenched than the newer, more "embryon-
ic" and still-evolving G7 /G8 environment ministerial forum that emerged 
only in 1992. Given that the environment ministerials appeared later in the 
summit system, compliance is expected to be lower with environmental 
commitments. What should further be noted is that the timing of such min-
isterials is also relevant to compliance. According to Nicholas Bayne: 
Ministerials which follow fairly soon after the summit are the 
most helpful in encouraging compliance. The timing of the IMF 
meetings of finance ministers, three months later, is useful in this 
regard. Pre-summit ministerials, like those of the environment 
ministers, can help shape the summit agenda but may not help 
compliance.5 
An additional intemational institutional variable of relevance is 
apparent in the summit's environment agenda. The empirical findings reveal 
that there is no net compliance during the period 1989-1991 in either climate 
change or biodiversity. Beginn ing in 1992 and onwards, however, there is a 
high leve] of sustained environmental compliance. This is primarily dueto 
two factors. First, 1992 marked the launching of a new era in environmen-
tal diplomacy with the convening of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 
Convening just three weeks later in Munich for their annual summit meet-
ing, the G7 leaders agreed on the importance of ratifying the climate change 
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and biodiversity conventions, and stressed the need to implement the deci-
sions embraced. Thus, as the Earth Summit quickly developed into a nest-
ed regime, a "Rio effect" is observed, corresponding with a higher level of 
environmental compliance by Canada and the US with the agreements 
reached atRio and endorsed at the G7 Summit.6 
The 1991/92 "Rio rise" was also coincident with the institutional-
ization of the G7 environment ministerials, beginning in Germany just prior 
to the 1992 Munich Summit, and then continuing in Florence, Italy in 1994, 
Hamilton, Canada in 1995, Cabourg, France in 1996, Miami, Florida in 
1997, and Leeds Castle, England in 1998. These G7/G8 environment min-
isterials have proceeded to endorse the Rio conventions and have empha-
sized the importance oftheir continued implementation. 
Finally, there is a third institutional variable of relevan ce. It relates 
to the expansion of both the preparatory and follow-up phases of the sum-
mit. This expansion has led sorne officials to conclude that the summit 
process itself has become more institutionalized over the last summit cycle. 
In turn, this has precipitated an overall rise in compliance by both Canada 
and the US during the summit's third cycle as compared to the previous two. 
According to a Canadian official: 
There was an inherent reluctance to institutionalize the process, 
although 1 think it's fair to say that over time, there became more 
frequent meetings after each Summit, and the meetings to prepare 
for the next Summit began earlier than before. So it became 
almost a full-time job and certainly became an annual exercise as 
opposed to a summer event - not only in the preparatory phases, 
but also in the stock-taking ofwhat had been achieved. 7 
Political Control by G7 Heads of State and Government 
In addition to institutions and regimes, the element of political control helps 
explain compliance with summit commitments. The fact that leaders them-
selves are present at the summit table seems to ensure that the decisions they 
reach, and the commitments they make, carry added weight. There are no 
higher-level bureaucrats at home to whom their decisions are deferred. As 
a result, when the leaders become personally associated with a summit com-
mitment, it is somewhat different than if that commitment had been pro-
duced by a group of ministers. As such, when the Prime Minister and 
President are directly involved in the creation of the commitment, that fact 
has a major impact on policy and the priority of policy implementation on 
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the home front. Moreover, when the head of state or government attaches a 
high degree of personal importance and commitment to certain issues~ the 
degree of implementation is even higher. 
This political control variable also takes into account the leader's 
individual personality and the importance he/she places on intemational 
institutions and agreements, including those of the G7/G8 more generally. 
For example, if a head of state or govemment demonstrates an attachment 
to sustainable development initiatives, consistently advances these themes at 
the annual' summits and demonstrates a commitment to multilateralism and 
the G7/G8 process more specifically, compliance levels will tend to be high-
er. 
Yet because G8 heads are not merely leaders, but democratically-
elected ones, their ability to impose their implementing will within their 
government is constrained by their political standing within society at large. 
When leaders and their parties enjoy high approval ratings and popularity, 
their ability to implement is increased. In addition, when domestic public 
opinion favors a particular issue - such as the environment in both Canada 
and the U.S. - even unpopular leaders at the time, facing a likely electoral 
defeat (such as Prime Minister Mulroney and President Bush) will comply 
with their communiqué commitments. This is primarily because leaders rec-
ognize the effects of public opinion and political pressure in areas important 
to their electorate. 
Improving Compliance and the Quality of Commitments 
In order for the G7/G8 summits to provide an environment for effective pol-
icymaking, they must establish a credible record, or the expectations placed 
upon them and the attention paid to them will surely fade. The recommen-
dations provided below are primarily based upon an analysis ofthe evidence 
cited above, supplemented by material drawn from the general scholarly lit-
erature on compliance, monitoring and enforcement. Six proposals for 
summit reform to enhance compliance and credibility are offered. 
First, following British Prime Minister John Major's suggestions for 
a more streamlined summit in 1992, the summit agenda should become less 
overloaded, and reflect a more intense focus on only those issues where the 
G7 /8 can make a notable difference. With the mass of intractable problems 
that has inundated the annual summit agenda, leaders are less able to reach 
cooperative agreements and understandings on policy matters, Jet alone 
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attempt to implement concrete strategies to alleviate the problems in the first 
instance. If leaders continue to attempt to resolve the myriad of issues they 
are confronted with every year and fail, they risk damaging their reputations 
and discrediting the summit process. 
Second, leaders should internationalize domestic policy issues only 
when, in the words of Putnam (1989) and Paarlberg (1997) a "positive syn-
ergistic linkage" can be developed. The solution is to remove from the agen-
da domestic issues that are not yet "ripe" as their internationalization may 
led to negative synergistic linkages, delaying domestic actions and reform . 
Third, summit leaders should focus on policy initiatives whose 
means-ends relationships are well understood and accepted. Leaders should 
articulate the means-ends relationships so asto establish their credibility and 
thus maximize their effects on prívate agents. 
Fourth, the G7/G8 should advance commitments in areas where 
individual leaders and the collective heads of state and government hold 
"formal" and real "authority". As explained by Aghion and Ti role ( 1997), 
formal authority is the right to decide whereas real authority is effective con-
trol over decisions. For example, issues of monetary policy have never 
been, for all practica! purposes, on the summit agenda. lt was readily under-
stood that most ofthe leaders had neither the right to decide monetary objec-
tives nor did they exercise control over monetary policy decisions. Loss of 
fast-track authority by the U.S. President would then imply that trade should 
not be part ofthe summit agenda. Likewise, commitments to be fulfilled by 
supranational organizations should occur where the G7/G8 has a high 
degree of real authority, such as the IMF, as opposed to organizations in 
which the G7 does not possess disproportional voting rights, such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO ). 
Fifth, related to issues of real and formal authority and principal-
agent problems is the credibility of the underlying institutional body that 
will develop, implement, and carry out policy. Policy dialogue at the sum-
mit level should embrace only those areas where adequate domestic institu-
tional bodies exist to develop and implement domestic policies. 
Commitments made by principals whose agents are ill-equipped to carry out 
the commitment can jeopardize the credibility and effectiveness ofthe poli-
cy announcement. In addition, the responsible institutional body should be 
identified out so that the principal-agent relationship is understood. 
Sixth, the 1998 Birmingham summit adopted a format similar to 
that initially envisaged for the first G7 summit, whereby the leaders meet 
completely separately from foreign and finance ministers. The importance 
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of leaders meeting on their own during the summit should not be overstat-
ed, however. Compliance with summit commitments is more likely to come 
with ministers on site during the three-day event. This is for three important 
reasons. First, on-site finance and foreign ministers will generally have a 
clearer understanding of the context and more specific aspects of the eco-
nomic and political commitments and will thus be able to suggest appropri-
ate implementation, monitoring and enforcement strategies. Second, with 
ministers present on site, leaders can immediately instruct them to con-
tribute resources from their respective ministries at the earliest possible 
stage in the implementation process. Third, ministers can advise heads of 
state and government immediately of unrealistic commitments and thus pre-
vent them from making commitments that cannot be kept. Thus, in order for 
compliance with summit commitments to be a realistic objective for the 
G7/G8 members, it is essential that they return to their previous format of 
having key ministers on site during the summit itself. 
These six suggestions for reform provide a guide asto what issues 
should be on the summit agenda by explicitly pointing toa more streamlined 
and focused agenda as well as a more coherent and directed communiqué. 
The final declarations should result in fewer commitments of higher quality 
and greater credibility. In this regard, commitments are more Iikely to be 
fulfilled when their impact on prívate agents and ultimate welfare targets are 
maximized. 
Conclusion 
lt is undeniable that when heads of state and government get together, there 
is no such thing as "just talk". However, when the summit agenda is filled 
with idle time and cocktail parties, as the summits have increasingly done, 
little can be expected. Yet the expectations and attention placed on the sum-
mits is high and continues to grow, as evidenced by the increasing number 
of media credentials issued each year. 
Compliance studies indicate that the summits do accomplish some-
thing, but perhaps notas muchas one would like them to. Reforms that Iead 
to a streamlined and simpler summit format and that narrow the issues dis-
cussed to those that meet the criteria suggested above should generate fewer, 
yet higher quality commitments, which are more likely to be fulfilled. 
Though what one expects the summit to accomplish may be narrowed, it is 
more Iikely that the summits can accomplish something. 
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Notes 
Energy is one functional area that stands apart in the von Furstenberg and 
Daniels studies, indicating that policymakers may be more successful at 
microeconomic reforms rather than macroeconomic policies. 
2 Interview with senior U.S. government official, Washington, D.C., March 
12, 1997. 
3 Interview with senior Canadian govemment official, Toronto, February 12, 
1997. Note that whereas G7 finance ministers meet four times ayear to 
specifically discuss G7-related matters, foreign ministers meet only once a 
year, and only on the margins ofthe opening session ofthe United Nations 
General Assembly. 
4 Interview with senior U.S. government official, Washington, D.C., March 
11, 1997. 
5 Interview with Sir Nicho las Bayne, Surrey, England, February 1, 1997. 
6 The Earth Summit is referred toas a "nested regime" because of the insti-
tutional developments that rapidly transpired vis-a-vis the Rio declarations 
following the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on the 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992. For example, the UN 
Commission on Sustainable Development was established in the aftermath 
of UNCED as the follow-up body for the Rio conventions. Moreover, per-
manent secretariats were established for both the Climate Change and 
Biodiversity Conventions in Bonn and Montreal respectively, with each 
possessing the institutional underpinnings of a more formal regime: fixed 
headquarters, a permanent secretariat, budgetary allocations and the cre-
ation of binding and enforceable rules. 
7 Interview with senior Canadian government official, Montreal, January 
31,1997. 
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